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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter was tried before the court on November 1, 2011, for the division
of assets and entry of the divorce. The court rendered its decision in writing on
November 29, 2011, which also included the court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. The decree in this matter was entered on December 12, 2011.
Defendant moved for reconsideration on December 19, 2011. The hearing
on that motion was held on February 6, 2012. The order denying the motion for
reconsideration was entered on February 8, 2012.
The Defendant/Appellant herein timely filed his notice of appeal on March 5,
2012.
The District Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order on Appeal on
October 17, 2012. The District Court upheld the Magistrate's ruling.
The Appellant filed this appeal on November 26, 2012.

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts in this matter are generally stipulated by the parties. There is very
little disagreement as to substantive factual issues.
The parties began living together in 2001.
The parties bought a house together in 2005. The parties stipulated that the
house is community property. Tr. p. 5, II. 8-9. In fact, the parties were not married
until 2007, so the house could not be characterized as community property, but the
parties acknowledged the house was in both names, they considered it a joint asset
and stipulated that it was subject to the jurisdiction of the court in the divorce.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 1
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The parties married on September 2, 2007.
Jared (Appellant) suffered an ankle injury on December 16, 2007, while
skiing. The injury occurred after the marriage of the parties. The court found that
Jared suffered an injury to his ankle and that his surgery for that injury was
unsuccessful, causing him a severe disability. Jared, separately and not joined by
Michelle, instituted a claim against the physician. The claim was subsequently
mediated. Both parties were required to sign the mediated settlement agreement.
In his testimony, Jared stated that it was essentially his understanding that his wife
was present to supplement any information about the accident as part of the
mediation, and that she needed to sign the agreement to waive any claims she
might have against the doctor. Tr. p. 231, II. 5-12.
The final check, however, was made payable to Jared only for $217,135.13.
Decision, November 29, 2010, pages 2 & 3. See Exhibit 10.
Jared deposited the $217,135.13 check into the joint checking account of the
parties on December 18, 2010. Both parties testified that the parties did not have
any other open checking accounts with the exception of the account for the Blind
Guy, a jointly owned business. Tr. p. 193, II. 17-23, Tr. p. 223, II. 6-10.
After deposit, the money is clearly traceable. Jared, in an effort to reduce the
mortgage payment of the parties, paid down a line-of-credit mortgage with his
separate personal injury funds. The parties testified that their mortgage was a lineof-credit that was "interest only" and the payment varied depending on the balance
due on the loan. There is no indication that Jared's intent was to do anything other
than benefit the parties regarding their monthly obligations. In his testimony, Jared

APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 2
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clearly believed that he had sole decision making and the control of that money. In
his testimony, he always refers to himself in first person regarding ownership and
use of that money. Tr. p. 223, II. 15-25. Essentially, Jared held a separate lien
against the home by virtue of using his separate funds to reduce community debt.
On May 10, 2011, $60,000 of these funds were transferred to Doc's
Pharmacy. The parties do not disagree with this factual statement. The $60,000
was transferred for starting the new pharmacy and it is clear that the proceeds used
to start the pharmacy were "from the ankle injury," as stated in direct examination
and answer by Michelle (Respondent). Tr. p. 86, II. 6-8, p. 87, II. 6-10.
There is currently a loan payable to the shareholders from the community
corporation, Doc's Pharmacy, Inc., in the amount of $62,753.00. Tr. p. 87, II. 20-25,
p. 88, II. 1-6.
In the decision by the trial court, the court characterized the $217,135.13 as
community property. The court did not specifically address or make a ruling on the
$62,753.00 loan to shareholders that was an asset of this marriage.

II
ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Did the Magistrate err in his characterization of the proceeds of the

Defendant's personal injury settlement as community property?
B.

Did the Magistrate err in failing to award the community the

shareholder loan made by the community to Plaintiff's business, thus entitling
Defendant to one-half of the shareholder loan showing on the books of the
company.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 3
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Ill
ARGUMENT

1.

Did the Magistrate err in his characterization of the proceeds of the

Defendant's personal injury settlement as community property?
As stated above, there is no factual dispute that Jared received $217,135.13
as a result of a personal injury he sustained in a skiing accident. Michelle does not
state the reasons why she was present in the mediation agreement and she does
not rebut Jared's assessment that she was there as support and to answer any
questions which may arise. There was no testimony or evidence by any of the
parties as to why Michelle signed or was required to sign the mediated settlement
agreement. There was no allegation by Michelle that any of the settlement proceeds
were for anything other than Jared's loss to his person, pain and suffering or
general damages. She has made no claims for award of funds for community loss.
As cited by the court, the Idaho case which instructs the court is Rogers v.
Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14 (Sup. Ct. 1975), which states that "damages for
pain and suffering and emotional distress are the separate property of the spouse
injured." The Supreme Court has also given us additional instruction in Cook v.
Cook, 102 Idaho 651 (Sup. Ct. 1981 ). Where the right to receive property during
the marriage arises as compensation for some right personal to one spouse alone,
the property takes its character from the right violated.
It is the position of the Appellant that once it has been agreed that he
received an injury and that he alone received a check payable to himself as a result
of his claim, and further that he alone, signed the settlement agreement with the

APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 4
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attorneys, he has directly traced the proceeds of his personal injury to the receipt
of$217, 135.13. The settlement agreement, Exhibit 10, further indicates repayment
for all medical costs incurred which would have been community obligations. It
would therefore follow, by logic, that any portion of the funds that were owed to the
community were, in fact, repaid to the community, with the remaining balance
payable to Jared Obricht as his sole and separate property.
The Appellant argues that he has shown, by prima facie evidence, that funds
were paid to him. The court analyzed that there was no breakdown of what was
community and what was separate, then defaults to the position that the whole
settlement is community. Clearly that is not true. Certainly, some of that payment
was for pain and suffering, and loss of the use of his person. There is no case law
to support the court's conclusion that if there is no breakdown, we have to infer that
all of the settlement was a community settlement. In fact, Appellant would argue just
the opposite. After he has shown the payment solely to him of funds which were
called "ankle money" by Plaintiff and her counsel throughout this case, it should be
inferred, that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the entire balance was
payable to Jared as his sole and separate property. It was his ankle. The court did
not find that the funds were commingled or were not traceable. The court simply
made the initial characterization that the property was community based upon a
presumption, which is not supported in case law or statute.
There was no argument that the settlement was gifted to the community nor
was there any testimony to that effect. In fact, Michelle would have the burden to
prove that the separate funds were gifted. Ustick v. Ustick 104 Idaho 215 (Ct. App.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 5
LD-(RRL\13051\01 )00018185.WPD;1

1983). Therefore, in the absence of any evidence which would disrupt Appellant's
clear evidence that he received a check as a result of his personal injury, the
characterization of the property is not transmuted by gift. At no point did Michelle
testify that she believed the proceeds to be community. There is a void of evidence
at trial that Michelle, at any time, made a claim for lost wages to the community.
The testimony solely surrounds the damage done by Dr. Greendyke to Jared.
Further, Jared clearly believed that he had sole decision making and the
control of that money. In his testimony, he always refers to himself in first person
regarding ownership and use of that money. Tr. p. 223, II. 15-25. This does not
evidence any intent to gift.
In the Arizona case of Jurek v. Jurek, 124 Arizona 596, the court reversed
its long standing rule that personal injury proceeds were community and, in fact,
instructed the court to determine the amount of lost wages and medical expenses,
and to then award the balance to the injured spouse as his sole and separate
property. In this case, the medical expenses and costs have already been deducted.
As stated above, there was no claim for lost wages. The remaining proceeds that
were paid to Jared Olbricht should be deemed his sole and separate property and
he should be reimbursed those sums from the community estate.
2.

Did the Magistrate err in failing to award the community the

shareholder loan made by the community to Respondent's business, thus entitling
Appellant to one-half of the shareholder loan showing on the books of the
company?

APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 6
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The Appellate court may approach this question several different ways. The
trial court did not address it at all and, therefore, was in error.
A.

Jared loaned $60,000 of separate funds to start the community

business, free of other debt. The debt owed to the community is a community asset.
It is subject to division by the court.
The Court of Appeals, in Jensen v. Jensen, 124 Idaho 162 (Ct. App. 1993),
included a discussion of fact which were very similar to the facts in this case. There
had been loans from separate property to a community business and the Court of
Appeals determined that the magistrate was in error in failing to make a finding on
the disputed factual issue of the business loans. In Jensen, there was insufficient
evidence regarding whether the contributions of capital were intended to be loans.
This is not the case in the current matter since the funds are clearly identified by
Michelle as shareholder loans. The point in Jensen, however, as it relates to the
instant case, is the magistrate's failure to properly address and support his findings
on this specific issue.
Michelle did not present any evidence of the value of her business. She did
not have expert testimony indicating how much her business would be worth if it
could continue to pay her wages in the amount of $14,400 per month as she
testified. Tr. p. 202, II. 16-19, p. 187, I. 5.
Both parties testified regarding $60,000 loaned to the community company
from the personal injury proceeds. On direct exam, Michelle was asked if the parties
had discussed using "proceeds from the ankle injury for the pharmacy purchase."
She answered in the affirmative. Tr. p. 86, I. 6. Michelle continued in her direct
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testimony regarding "the $60,000." Tr. p. 87, I. 6. At no time was the $60,000
characterized as anything other than the money from the ankle injury. Michelle
acknowledges that $60,000 still exists on the corporate books of Doc's Pharmacy,
Inc., as a corporate loan to shareholders. The balance owing to the shareholders
at this time is actually $62,753.90. Tr. p. 87, I. 24, p. 88, I. 6.
There is a rebuttal presumption that all properties (and the character thereof)
acquired during the marriage is community property. Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811
(Sup. Ct. 1983). During the marriage Jared made a loan to the community of
$60,000 of his separate funds (the presumption that those funds were community
having been rebutted). That debt is acknowledged on the federal tax return of the
corporation which has been prepared at the behest of Michelle. She does not
dispute that the community owes $60,000 borrowed to finance the community
business.
In Michelle's books, she began tracking, during the process of this divorce,
what income she should actually be taking. This is based partly upon what she is
paying a second pharmacist. When she tracked her actual projected income, her
profits became negative. Michelle stated in response to a question as follows:
Question:

"So when you were giving us figures about the retained
earnings that you have as being a large negative figure, does
that come from your P&L that you prepared?"

Response:

"Um-hmm" Tr. p. 186, II. 15-19.

Creating hypothetical figures, Michelle was able to create a loss, thus giving
the appearance that her business had very little value. In fact, there was no
valuation of the business.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 8
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In fact, Michelle has drug inventory of $42,000 which is paid for. Tr. p. 192,
II. 10-11.
The $62,753 shareholder loan is clearly a community asset, separate from
the corporation. Michelle was awarded the business known as Doc's Pharmacy,
Inc., along with its liabilities. She will presumably continue to operate that business
and also continue to have sales which have been increasing. This debt will continue
to be an obligation that she owes to Jared Olbricht and Michelle Duhon. The debt
to her company was apparently generally calculated by the court in arriving at a $0- value for her business (although the court was not clear). If Michelle is credited
for the debt, as an offset to value, then it is a valid debt that must be paid by the
corporation. Michelle was not, nor should she be awarded that account as her own
asset. To do so would unequally divide the assets by giving her a $62,753 asset
owed by a separate entity. The debt should be either divided between the parties,
or reimbursed to Jared as his separate property as set forth above.
A review of the court's decision, at page 5 (referencing faxed numbers at the
top of the page) shows error. The court assumed that Michelle was going to borrow
$136,800 per year to meet payroll. In fact, Michelle has been operating the business
for two years without having to do so. She further testified she did not intend to pay
herself the unpaid salary. Tr. p. 187, II. 23-25, p. 188, II. 1-4. The property lease
was not valued. The inventory of the business, as stated, was $42,000. The court
stated "any value from the inventory is offset by the liabilities of pharmacy." This
finding is not supported by the evidence. The court did not have sufficient evidence
to value the business at a "net zero value." The only fixed liability of the corporation
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is the liability to the shareholders, and Jared Olbricht was one of those shareholders
at the time of trial of this matter. Jared Olbricht should be awarded a judgment for
his share of that shareholder debt.
The appellate court in Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d 844
(1974), found:
Debts which were not evidenced by written instrument but were
accounts on the books of the corporation to which they were owed
and which had no due dates or interest charge were properly
classified as community property and assigned to respondent in the
division of the property where it was shown that such debts would be
satisfied without expense to the respondent and there was no
evidence that such accounts were not debts.
B.

There is another approach to this issue:

The Court could order reimbursement to Jared of his separate funds. In
Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845 (Sup. Ct. 1976), the court found "where separate

funds of one spouse are used to benefit the community, such as payment of a debt
arising from acquisition of community property, the separate estate is entitled to
reimbursement." In this case, Jared clearly invested $60,000 of his separate funds
directly into the pharmacy business to pay the debt for acquisition of inventory and
equipment, thus benefitting the community, by creation of a business which is
continuing to grow. The trial court should have found that the debt owed by Doc's
Pharmacy, Inc. to its creditors (Jared and Michelle) is a liability, just as she owes her
lease, and it is assumed that she will pay those liabilities. Jared should be
reimbursed, at a minimum, $60,000 from the business. Again, she received a credit
for this debt against value of the corporation. The debt must be paid. If she is not
obligated to pay the debt, Michelle received a $62,753 windfall and an unequal
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distribution. If Michelle does pay the debt to herself only, she also receives a
windfall.
In its Decision, the trial court made no finding that there should be an
unequal distribution of assets and debts. The court, on the contrary, found that the
division of property made was a substantially equal division of property. It can be
inferred, therefore, that the court intended to find that this case warranted a
substantially equal division of property. Idaho law requires such a division. Idaho
Code §32-712.
Whichever approach the district court finds appropriate, the trial court erred
in not addressing the $62,753 shareholder loan as a community asset. Clearly, it
is Jared's position that the $60,000 was loaned to the corporation from his sole and
separate assets in order to benefit the corporation and such asset should be
returned to him fully, under Freeburn, prior to awarding the community assets and
debts.
IV.
CONCLUSION

The Trial Court in this matter exceeded its authority and the matter should
be remanded to the Trial Court for further determination.
The court's decision that Jared's personal injury settlement was community
was not supported by the law and the facts of the case. The findings should be
reversed and the character of the proceeds of the personal injury settlement should
be awarded to Jared as his sole and separate property, with the necessary
recalculation of the distribution of assets and debts.
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The court did not address the asset of the shareholder loan of the
corporation which is owed to Jared Olbricht and Michelle Duhon. This matter should
be remanded to the Magistrate to divide this asset which was omitted from the
court's decision.
Appeiiant requests attorneys fees and costs incurred herein.
DATED this ~ d a y of March, 2013.
Respectfully submitted,
LIESCHE & REAGAN, P.A.

~RLIE~~
) i ...=

RAMONA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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